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Most Americans work at will-they can quit in a huff,
but be fired on a whim. That is the double-edged sword of at-
will employment. 2 What these workers gain in freedom, they
sometimes lose in rights. One of the rights at-will employees
have tried to claim, with moderate success, is the right not to
be fired or otherwise treated adversely on the basis of race. For
many of them, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 ("Title
VIr') provides that protection, prohibiting employers from
taking any racially motivated adverse employment action.
But millions of these workers are not able to make use
of Title VI's protections, either because the employers they
work for are too small, and therefore exempt, or because they
have failed to comply with its procedural prerequisites like
* ©2001 Joanna L. Grossman. All Rights Reserved.
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I McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.).
2 "'Employment at will' is a term long used to mean that an employer
may discharge an employee without restriction, that is, for any reason or for no reason,
without incurring any liability to the employee." 82 AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge
§ 1 (2000).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-§ 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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administrative exhaustion and a relatively short statute of
limitations. For this group of workers, another federal civil
rights statute provides some relief.
Section 1981, 4 the modern iteration of a reconstruction-
era civil rights act, prohibits race discrimination in contracting.
For the last three decades, the predicate for most § 1981 cases
has been an employment contract. At-will employees, however,
do not have a piece of paper labeled "contract" nor a standard
oral agreement that clearly brings them within the purview of
the statute. Federal courts across the country have thus been
grappling for the past few years with the question whether
such employees have a contractual relationship with their
employers, such that § 1981 may be invoked to challenge
discrimination against them on the basis of race. The Second
Circuit weighed in last term in Lauture v. IBM.5
At-will employees have racked up considerable
successes, convincing four federal courts of appeals-including,
most recently, the Second Circuit-to apply § 1981 to them,
while losing in only one circuit. While these decisions have
quite assuredly reached the right outcome, their reasoning
makes them precarious. Most have relied on contract law in
the state where the suit was brought to determine whether the
employee-employer relationship is contractual. In most states,
that approach will ensure that § 1981 applies to at-will
employees. But not in all. Some states, although recognizing
at-will employment, do not view the relationships as
contractual.6 If state law supplies the definition of contract for
§ 1981 purposes, at-will employees in those states lose the
protection provided by the statute. This approach is wrong.
The benefits of an important federal civil rights law should not
be hamstrung by the idiosyncrasies of a particular state's rules
of contract law What these decisions should turn on instead is
federal common law-a uniform, federal interpretation of
§ 1981 that protects all at-will employees, even those in states
with stricter definitions of contractual relationships.
4 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
5 216 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2000).
6 See, e.g., Jones v. Becker Group, 38 F Supp. 2d 793, 796-97 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(noting that, under Missouri law, at-will employers do not have a contractual
relationship with their employers). See infra note 133.
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Tins Article is divided into four parts. Part I describes
the history and origins of § 1981, its bloodletting by the
Supreme Court, and its ultimate restoration and reinvigoration
by Congress. Part II first describes the federal appellate
opinions addressing the applicability of § 1981 to at-will
employment. It then examines the source of law question:
whether state law, federal law, or some combination ought to
dictate the definition of "contract" in § 1981. It concludes that
federal common law, which may draw on well-established state
law principles, should control. Part III examines the possible
interpretations of "contract" as used in § 1981, looking at both
state and federal law, ultimately concluding that at-will
employees should be protected from race discrinination on the
same terms as other employees. Part IV explores why § 1981
continues to be important, in light of the substantial
protections provided by Title VII. This section looks at the
doctrinal differences between the two statutes and examines
some empirical evidence about § 1981's continuing use. It
concludes that § 1981 remains an important tool in the fight
for racial equality
I. SECTION 1981'S BIRTH AND REBIRTHS
A. Enactment and Early History
Immediately following the Civil War and ratification of
the Thirteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a wide-ranging
ban on race discrimination. Part of this Act, eventually codified
as 42 U.S.C. § 1981,7 addressed the problem of race
discrimination in contracting. As originally enacted, § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act provided, in relevant part:
7 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. This
provision of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 was first codified as Revised
Statutes § 1977, then recodified as 8 U.S.C. § 41, then finally recodified as 42 U.S.C. §
1981. When § 1981 was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the original § 1981




All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens 8
To remove any doubt about its authority to pass this act
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment (which, narrowly
construed, did nothing more than abolish slavery), 9 Congress
re-enacted this provision as § 16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870
after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
As first enacted, § 1981 was used to challenge the Black
Codes used by southern states to limit the rights and
opportunities of newly freed slaves." But after the 1870s, the
statute went largely unused for nearly a century 12
The modern use of § 1981 came about through a series
of cases in the 1970s and 1980s, in which the Supreme Court
both breathed new life into the statute and hammered out its
contours more precisely 13 Section 1981 was resurrected by the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 14 which held that the statute applied not only to
government-sponsored discrimination, but to private
discrimination as well.15 Section 1981's breadth had been in
8 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994)).
9 The competing view of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the right
to federalize and enforce civil rights more generally, rather than simply the power to
make sure "slavery per se did not return." Sanford V Levinson, New Perspectives on
the Reconstruction Court, 26 STAN. L. REV. 461, 481 (1974).
i0 See Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114 §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144. The re-enactment
made only two minor changes. See generally Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1982) (discussing legislative history of § 1981).
11 See, e.g., Hart v. Hoss, 26 La. Ann. 90, 93 (La. 1874) (interpreting the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 to annul all existing state laws creating legal disabilities on the
basis of race).
12 See generally HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 325 (2001).
13 Section 1983, arguably the most important federal civil rights statute, lay
similarly dormant for nearly a century, before being resurrected in 1961 by Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), as a "broad cause of action to remedy constitutional
violations." Michael Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts: From
Statutory Interpretation to Common Law Rules, 19 CONN. L. REV. 53, 53 (1986).
14 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
i5 Id. at 459-60. The Court established the groundwork for this ruling seven
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question for nearly a century, since the Court's ruling in the
Civil Rights Cases.16 In those cases, the Court invalidated
significant portions of another reconstruction-era civil rights
act, the Civil Rights Act of 1875,17 which prohibited race
discrimination in public accommodations like inns,
restaurants, and the like.18
In those cases, the Supreme Court took an extremely
narrow view of Congress' power under the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to legislate against race
discnmination. 19 The Court's rebuke arguably stood for the
proposition that neither the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth
Amendment was broad enough to enable Congress to regulate
or prohibit private acts of race discrimnation.20 Although not
directly considering the validity of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866
or 1870, the Supreme Court obliquely suggested that they
should also be construed, because of lints on Congress' power,
to apply only to "state action."21 It would, the Court cautioned,
be "running the slavery argument into the ground" to
characterize acts of private discrimination as inflicting
years earlier in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), in which it held that
§ 1982, a companion provision dealing with race discrimination affecting property
rights, applied to purely private conduct. The rationale for that decision was equally
applicable to § 1981. See Levinson, supra note 9 at 482, for the critique of this reading
of Congressional intent because "it would have been a stunning repudiation of an
almost omnipresent racism for Congress to have committed itself in 1866 to such
equality for blacks." Id. See also Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Myer: Clio, Bemused and
Confused Muse, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 89 (discussing the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866).
1 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17 Id. at 26.
18 See Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335.
19 See generally Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952) (discussing the gradual restriction of federal
civil rights laws and constitutional amendments by strict constructionist judges who
were hostile to the idea of nationalized civil rights); Levinson, supra note 9, at 468, 470
(noting the Supreme Coures "potential antagonism to Reconstruction," which "did
nothing to discourage the [South's] policy of noncooperation").
20 The prohibition against race discrimination in public accommodations was
resurrected nearly a century later by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this time pursuant
to the Constitution's Commerce Clause. See Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1994) (prohibiting race discrimination in public accommodations); see
also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title
II against challenge that Congress did not have sufficient authority under the
Commerce Clause to enact it); cf. EEOC v. Ratcliff, 906 F.2d 1314, 1315 (1990) (noting
that Title VII was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
21 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 6.
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"badges of slavery " 22 Thus, § 1981 stood on shaky ground until
the Court's ruling in Railway Express.28
B. Sectin 1981 and Employment
The Court's ruling in Railway Express, later reaffirmed
in Runyon v. McCrary24 and Patterson v. McLean Credit
Unlon,25 and eventually codified by Congress, 26 transformed
§ 1981 into an effective and frequently used weapon in the
arsenal of employment discrimination lawyers. In addition to
its holding that § 1981 was broad enough to reach private
discrimination generally, the Court in Railway Express directly
held that § 1981 was applicable to claims of employment
discrimination, 27 a conclusion that had already been reached by
several federal courts of appeals. 28 The Court applied § 1981 to
employment contracts despite the fact that it overlapped to a
signficant extent with Title VII.29 Although the justifications
for permitting both statutes to stand side-by-side have lessened
somewhat in the quarter-century since Railway Express was
22 Id. at 24, 25; see also Casper, supra note 15, at 126 (noting that the Civil
Rights Cases left the applicability of § 1981 to private discrimination in question for
nearly a century).
23 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
24 427 U.S. 160, 168, 173-75 (1976).
25 491 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1989). The Supreme Court in Patterson
expressly requested that the parties submit briefs on whether its decision in Runyon
(and, by implication, Railway Express) ought to be overruled or affirmed. See infra note
38.
26 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c); see infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; see
also H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630
('[t]his subsection also confirms section 1981's coverage of both public and private
sector employment").
27 421 U.S. at 459-60.
28 Id. at 460 (discussing cases); see also Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500,
505 (6th Cir. 1974); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 993-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621, 622 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1385 (4th Cir. 1972); Caldwell v.
Nat'l Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1045 (5th Cir. 1971); Young v. ITT, 438 F.2d 757,
759-60 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wis. Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 481-84 (7th Cir. 1970).
29 Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 461 (concluding that while Title VII and
§ 1981 are not entirely co-extensive in their coverage, they are not mutually exclusive
and the remedies that are available, therefore, "although related, and directed to
most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent!').
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decided,3 0 it remains possible today for aggrieved employees to
pursue claims of race discrimination under both statutes
simultaneously
1. The Supreme Court Lamits § 1981
Although Congress expressly declined an opportuity to
eliminate the overlap between Title VII and § 1981 in the
employment context,31 the Supreme Court in the 1980s dealt
§ 1981 two major blows. First, the Court in General Building
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania held that § 1981 could not be
used to attack unintentional, or disparate impact,
discrimiation.32 The District Court in that case had, contrary
to most other courts, interpreted § 1981 to be roughly co-
extensive with Title VII.33 Title VII had been interpreted early
on, and later expressly amended, to permit employees to attack
facially neutral employment practices with a
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group.3 4 The
3 0 See infra text accompanying notes 222-36.
31 In Runyon v. McCrary, the Supreme Court noted that Congress, "in
enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 specifically considered
and rejected an amendment that would have repealed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as
interpreted by this Court in [Railway Express], insofar as it affords private-sector
employees a right of action based on racial discrimination in employment." 427 U.S. at
174. The principle of enhanced stare decisis--applicable to court interpretations that
have been ratified implicitly by Congress-is ultimately what saved the ruling in
Railway Express and Runyon against later attacks.
32 See 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). The Court had failed to reach this question m
at least three prior cases involving § 1981 claims that were premised on a disparate
impact theory of discrimination. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634
(1979) (dismissing case on ground of mootness); N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979) (decimng to reach question whether § 1981 applies to unintentional
discrimination); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodnguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977)
(vacating class certification in case brought under disparate impact theory).
33 See Pennsylvania v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F Supp. 329, 401
(E.D. Pa. 1978). But see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 267 (2d
Cir. 1980) (refusing to apply § 1981 to disparate impact claims because "the language,
structure and history of § 1981 all point to the conclusion that the statute was simply
intended to prohibit purposeful racial discrimination"), affd, 463 U.S. 582 (1983);
Mescall v. Burrus, 603 F.2d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1979) (interpreting § 1981 more
narrowly than Title VII because of the former's strong ties to the Fourteenth
Amendment).
34 The Supreme Court first sanctioned this use of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Congress ultimately amended Title VII to make clear
that it protected against disparate impact discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1994). Proof of disparate impact discrimination only entitles its victims to equitable
2001]
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Supreme Court, however, declined to interpret § 1981 as
broadly as Title VII, given the different contexts in which each
statute was enacted. The "principal object of the legislation
was to eradicate the Black Codes," the Court explained, laws
that embodied "express racial classifications" and imposed a
"range of civil disabilities on freedmen. '35 Although some of the
Black Codes were in fact facially neutral, such as those
penalizing vagrancy, the Court concluded that § 1981 was
created to target the facially discriminatory aspects of these
laws.3 6
Then, six years later, the Court drastically limited the
scope of § 1981 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Unwn.3 7 In
Patterson, the Court was asked to interpret the "make and
enforce" language in § 1981, specifically to decide whether it
permitted plaintiffs to challenge post-hiring conduct.38
Brenda Patterson, an African-American bank teller,
brought suit against McLean Credit Umon, alleging that her
supervisor harassed her, failed to promote her, and ultimately
laid her off, all on the basis of race.39 In response, the
defendant argued that § 1981 did not provide a cause of action
for racial harassment.40
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that § 1981 did not
regulate all aspects of the relationship between two contracting
parties, but instead merely prohibited race discrimination in
the "making" and "enforcement" of contracts. 41 Sharply
relief, however, rather than the full panoply of remedies available to plaintiffs able to
prove intentional discrimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)
(1994).
35 Gen. Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 386-87.
36 Id. at 387-88 (Congress "acted to protect the freedmen from intentional
discrimination by-those whose object was 'to make their former slaves dependent serfs,
victims of unjust laws, and debarred from all progress and elevation by organized
social prejudices.' ") (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1839 (1866) (Rep.
Clarke)).37 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
38 The Court also requested briefing and argument on whether to overrule
Runyon v. McCrary and thereby limit § 1981 to protect only against discrimination by
state actors. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 617 (1988) (ordering
briefing and reargument). The Court ultimately decided to adhere to precedent and
continue to apply § 1981 to purely private conduct. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 175.
39 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 169.40 Id. at 170.
41 Id. at 176-77.
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deviating from lower court precedent,42 the Court held that the
right to make contracts applied only to contract formation. In
other words, an employer could not refuse to enter into an
employment contract with an applicant because of race without
running afoul of § 1981. But that protection against
discrimination did not extend to conduct by an employer after
the contractual relationship has been established.43 Thus, for
§ 1981 purposes,44 an employer could-under Patterson-
harass, transfer, or demote an employee on the basis of race
with impunity The right to enforce contracts, according to the
Court in Patterson, applied only to conduct of an employer
designed to impair an employee's ability to avail herself of the
legal process. 45
Despite its tolerance of overlap between Title VII and
§ 1981 in Railway Express, the Court in Patterson expressly
tried to lint it. 4 6 Applying § 1981 to post-formation conduct,
the Court reasoned, would undermine Title VII's elaborate
administrative scheme designed to promote conciliation rather
than litigation.47
For the plaintiff in Patterson, the Court's narrowing of
§ 1981 left her harassment and layoff claims unremediable. 48
But her failure-to-promote claim was perhaps viable. Whether
such a claim would be actionable under § 1981, the Court held,
"depends upon whether the nature of the change in position
was such that it involved the opportunity to enter into a new
42 Prior to Patterson, every federal court to consider the issue had held that
§ 1981 applied to both pre- and post-formation conduct. See Harry Hutchison, The
Collision of Employment-At-Will, Section 1981 & Gonzalez: Discharge, Consent and
Contract Sufficiency, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 207, 226 (2001).4 3 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177.
44 As discussed below, there is considerable overlap between § 1981 and Title
VII in the employment context. Thus, although Patterson seemingly permitted
employers to discriminate in a variety of ways, Title VII would, for some employees,
provide an alternative remedy. See infra text accompanying notes 203-47.4 5 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177-78.
46 See id. at 181 (despite accepting some "necessary overlap," the Court was
"reluctant' to impose a "tortuous construction" or use a "twist[ed] interpretation" to
read § 1981 and Title VII to cover the same post-formation discriminatory conduct).
47 Id. at 180-81 C'By reading section 1981 not as a general proscription of
racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, but as limited to the
enumerated rights within its express protection, specifically the right to make and
enforce contracts, we may preserve the integrity of Title Virs procedures without
sacrificing any significant coverage of the civil rights laws.").
48 Id. at 179.
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contract with the employer."49 If the sought-after promotion
would create a "new and distinct relation" between the parties,
the right to make contracts on race-neutral terms might be
implicated.50
2. Congress Breathes New Life Into § 1981
Patterson's life was short. Congress overruled the
Court's restrictive interpretation of § 1981 by statute as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Renumerating the original
provision as § 1981(a), Congress added the following
subsections:
(b) For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce
contracts" includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against
impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment
under color of State law.
51
The express purpose of subsection (b) was to undo the damage
wrought by Patterson and restore § 1981's fuller scope.52
Subsection (c) served to validate the Court's decision to apply
§ 1981 to private conduct.
3. The Immediate Aftermath of Patterson
In the first few years after the Civil Rights Act of 1991
was passed, Patterson continued to wield some power. To
resolve a developing circuit split, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a case questiomng the retroactivity of the 1991
amendments to § 1981. In that case, the Court held that the
amendments were not retroactive and thus did not apply to
49 Id. at 185.
50 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185. Whether Brenda Patterson's promotion met this
test was never reached by the Supreme Court because the defendant had not
challenged the applicability of § 1981 to that claim.
51 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
52 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(), at 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630 ('there is a compelling need for legislation to overrule the
Patterson decision and ensure that federal law prohibits all race discrimmation").
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claims that arose before November 1991.53 Thus, for some time,
courts were busy interpreting Patterson as it applied to those
cases, even though the case itself had been overruled by
statute. 54
In Patterson's wake, lower courts agreed that claims of
racially motivated discharge were no longer cognizable under
§ 1981.55 Most courts gave even broader effect to the Court's
intent to narrow § 1981, finding it inapplicable to claims of
wrongful transfer as well.56
With respect to claims other than discharge, some
courts tried to determine whether the allegedly discriminatory
action created a "new and distinct relation," the touchstone
identified by the Court in Patterson. The results were mixed.
Some courts that undertook this inquiry rejected transfer
claims, for example, on the theory that a transfer is "simply a
continuation of a previous contractual relationship."57 Others
treated significant transfers as effectmg a change in
contractual status, thereby falling within § 1981's rubric.58
The hardest category of cases involved failure-to-
promote claims because the Supreme Court in Patterson had
specifically suggested that such claims might remain
cognizable under § 1981. Determining whether a particular
wrongfully denied promotion would have created a "new and
distinct relation," as the Court seemed to require under § 1981,
was an endeavor described by courts and commentators alike
53 See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
54 A decade later, the non-retroactivity ceases to have much meamng, but for
several years after Patterson was decided, new cases based on past conduct were
affected. According to one commentator, the Courts decision in Patterson caused 825 of
961 then pending cases to be dismissed on the merits. See George H. Taylor,
Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAuL L. REV. 259, 262 (1995); see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-
40(), at 90 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 629 (statement of Julius
LeVonne Chambers, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.)
(noting that hundreds of race discrinination claims had been dismissed in the year
following the Courts decision in Patterson).
55 See, e.g., Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490, 493 (6th Cir.
1992); Hayes v. Cmty. Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir. 1991); Prather
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1257 (6th Cir. 1990). See also Taylor,
supra note 54, at 299 n.181 (collecting cases). Ultimately, every circuit to consider the
issue ruled that discriminatory discharge cases were not cognizable under § 1981. Id.
at 299 n.182.
56 See Taylor, supra note 54, at 294 n.155 (collecting cases).
57 See id. at 294.
58 See id. at 294-95.
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as "hairsplitting."5 9 In the end, courts looked for some
substantial change in compensation, level of responsibility, and
status before treating a sought-after promotion as protected by
§ 1981.60 Indeed, Brenda Patterson herself was unable to
sustain this burden, and thus her failure-to-promote claim was
ultimately dismissed, despite the Supreme Court's encouraging
words about her prospects for success. 61 For all practical
purposes, § 1981 was relegated to refusal-to-hire claims, the
most difficult cases in which to prove discrimination.62
II. SECTION 1981, AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT, AND THE SOURCE
OF LAW
As courts began to hear cases involving post-1991
conduct, the emphasis shifted from understanding Patterson to
understanding the effect of its reversal. One obvious
consequence of Congress' overruling Patterson was that
employees working pursuant to a contract could use § 1981 to
challenge discriminatory conduct of their employers at any
stage-including, of course, a discriminatory discharge. One of
the issues repeatedly raised in litigation was whether § 1981
could also be used by at-will employees to challenge
discriminatory discharges. 63 At the heart of these cases is the
determination whether at-will employees have a sufficiently
contractual relationship with their employers to bring them
within the purview of § 1981, which applies only to
discrimination in contracting. 64 The sticking point in contract
59 See id. at 283 (collecting citations).
60 See id. at 289.
61 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 39 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 1994).
62 See, e.g., Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1297 n.12 (iith Cir.
1999) (noting refusal-to-hire claims still cognizable after Patterson); Samuel
Issacharoff & Erca Worth Hams, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?
The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 795 (1997) (stating that
compared to discharge cases, "refusal-to-hire cases are much more difficult to prove
where the number of applicants outnumbers positions available and where many
factors unknown to the potential litigant could have been taken into consideration").
63 Prior to Patterson, courts routinely applied § 1981 to at-will employees
without considering the propriety of doing so. See Hutchison, supra note 42, at 226.
64 The original provision of § 1981 refers to the making and enforcement of
"contracts"; one of the provisions added in 1991 refers to incidents of a "contractual
relationship." See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), (b) (1994).
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terms, discussed in detail in Part III below, 65 is that at-will
employment is terminable by either party without notice or
cause-a feature that sets it apart from arrangements
conventionally recogmzed as contracts.
In the course of considering this question, courts have
paid little or no attention to the source of law, assuming for the
most part that the answer can-and should-be found in state
decisional reporters. Tins Part first describes the analysis
undertaken by each of the five appellate courts that have
considered the applicability of § 1981 to at-will employees,
noting both the outcome reached and the source of law It then
raises the question whether courts should look to state or
federal common law to define "contract" under § 1981. The
touchstone of tins inquiry is an analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a
statute winch governs the role of state law in construing
federal civil rights acts.
A. Federal Appellate Cases
In the past three years, five federal appellate courts
have considered whether at-will employees may invoke § 1981
to challenge racially motivated discharges. Four of these courts
addressed the issue head-on, each holding that § 1981 protects
at-will employees just as it protects employees working
pursuant to a formal employment contract.66 The fifth court
considered, but did not decide the issue. However, in the course
of its discussion, that court strongly suggested that at-will
employees would not find protection ajamst wrongful
discharge under § 1981.67 All five courts relied on state law to
characterize the at-will employment relationship for § 1981
purposes.
6 5 See tnfra notes 167-68, 176 and accompanying text.
66 See Lauture v. IBM, 216 F.3d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2000); Perry v. Woodward,
199 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. dented, 529 U.S. 111O (2000); Spriggs v.
Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1999); Fadeyl v. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n, 160 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1998).




1. The First Round of Decisions
The Fifth Circuit was the first to rule on whether § 1981
covers at-will employees. In Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n,68 the plaintiff complained of racially discriminatory
scheduling, allocation of office resources, and, ultimately,
termination. 69 She also objected when she and another black
employee facetiously were given applications for membership
in the Ku Klux Klan. Important to the court's decision was
Texas law, which clearly treats at-will employment as
contractual in nature. 70 Just as voidable contracts, which are
enforceable at one-party's option, are contracts nonetheless, so
are contracts that either party may terminate at will.71 The
court thus concluded that, under § 1981, "even though an at-
will employee can be fired for good cause, bad cause, or no
cause at all, he or she cannot be fired for an illicit cause."72 The
court made clear that its decision relied on state law, noting in
a footnote that it was not bound to follow any "federal case law
interpreting at-will employment relationships in other
states."73
The Tenth Circuit followed suit in Perry v. Woodward,74
a case in which the plaintiff filed a racial harassment suit
under § 1981 because, among other things, she had been
repeatedly chastised for hiring "hot blooded" Hispamcs.1 5 The
court of appeals relied on New Mexico law, which characterizes
at-will employment as a contract of indefinite duration. The
contract consists of the employee's provision of services in
exchange for the employer's payment of wages. 76 And although
duration is not one of the terms of the contract, the contractual
nature of the arrangement is sufficient to bring it within
§ 1981. The otherwise unfettered right of termination becomes
therefore limited by that statute.77 As with the Fifth Circuit,
68 160 F.3d at 1048.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1050-51.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1051-52.
73 Fadeyl, 160 F.3d at 1049 n.11.
74 199 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 1999).
75 Id. at 1130-31.
76 Id. at 1133.
77 Id.
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the court here made some casual references to Congressional
intent and general principles of statutory interpretation, but,
in the end, made its decision based on state contract law
Third in line, the Fourth Circuit decided Spriggs v.
Diamond Auto Glass.78 James Spriggs filed a § 1981 claim for
racial harassment when is supervisor called him "dumb
monkey" and "mgger," leading hun eventually to quit his job.7 9
Like its sister circuits, the court relied on state law (Maryland)
to characterize the relationship as contractual, despite the
indefinite duration of the employment relationship. The
contract consisted of a promise to pay in exchange for a
promise to provide services.80 The court thus found § 1981 to be
broad enough to encompass at-will employment relationships
because Maryland has defined them as contractual.
2. The Latest Decision
Recently, the Second Circuit joined these three federal
appellate courts by concluding in Lauture v. IBM 8 ' that at-will
employees are protected by § 1981 from race discrimination in
employment, resolving a long brewing split among district
courts within that circut.82 Plaintiff Jackie Lauture, an at-will
employee, sued her employer, alleging a racially discriminatory
discharge. The court of appeals ostensibly drew on the
"ordinary meaning" of the word "contract," garnered primarily
from the Second Restatement of Contracts, to evaluate the at-
will relationship between the plaintiff and her employer. 83 But
the court also drew on New York's treatment of at-will
employment as a contractual relationship in other contexts.84
Although the court suggested that § 1981 plaintiffs need not
78 165 F.3d 1015 (4th Cir. 1999).
7 9 Id. at 1017 n.2.
8 0 Id. at 1018.
81 216 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2000).
82 Compare, e.g., Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 964 F Supp. 665, 675-
76 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (at-will employees not covered by § 1981), affid, 162 F.3d 1148 (2d
Cir. 1998) with Hartzog v. Reebok Intl Ltd., 77 F Supp. 2d 478, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (at-will employees are protected by § 1981). See also Hutchison, supra note 42, at
214 (noting the "distinct split of opinion" within the Second Circuit).8 3 Lauture, 216 F.3d at 261.
84 Id. at 262-63 (noting that an at-will employee may have a cause of action
under New York law for tortious interference with employment relationships).
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prove that their employment relationships conformed to state
contract law, "as opposed to the ordinary common-law
defimtion,"85 it nonetheless proceeded to distinguish a case
from another circuit because it was interpreting Washington
rather than New York law 86 And in the course of reviewing the
decisions of its three sister circuits, the court referred to the
"state law at issue" in each case 87 -an odd statement given
that the task of each court was to interpret a federal statute. In
the end the court joined the growing consensus with the
following explanation: "We do not see how the law of the state
of New York requires a different result."8 8 Applying this vague
amalgamation of general common law and New York law, the
court found Lauture's relationship with her employer to be
sufficiently contractual for § 1981 purposes.
3. The Lone Dissenting Voice
Among federal appellate courts, only the Seventh
Circuit has hesitated to find that § 1981 protects at-will
employees from race discrimination. Although the court in
Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machne Company89 purportedly
refused to consider plaintiff Juana Gonzalez' § 1981 claim
because it was not properly before them,90 it nonetheless
addressed it in dicta. Because she was an at-will employee and
"did not have any contractual rights regarding the term of her
employment,"91 the court suggested, she could not claim
protection under § 1981.92
8 5 Id. at 261.
86 Id. at 261 n.4.
87 Id. at 263.
88 Lauture, 216 F.3d at 263.
89 133 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 1998).
90 Id. at 1033 (holding that Gonzalez was barred from raising claims
regarding her termination on appeal because she had failed to raise them in the court
below).
91 Id. at 1035.
92 Later in the opinion, the court clarifies that its words are dicta: "However,
we need not determine whether Gonzalez's at-will status provided adequate support
for her § 1981 claim because even if we were to allow Gonzalez' § 1981 claim to stand,
based on finding Gonzalez had a contractual relationship with Ingersoll, it would fail
[because she could not prove intentional discrimination.]" Id. at 1035.
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit diverged not only in its
ultimate conclusion about the applicability of § 1981 to at-will
employees, but also in its approach to the problem. The four
other circuits each embarked on a search for an underlying
contractual relationship. Once found, the courts then
superimposed § 1981-and its prohibition on racial
discrinnation-on the relationship. With that approach, an at-
will employment relationship remains terminable at-will,
provided the termination does not violate § 1981's strictures.
Thus the Fifth Circuit's mantra that an at-will employee can
be fired for no cause, but not for an illicit cause.
But the Seventh Circuit apparently did not find
Gonzalez' § 1981 claim invalid because the underlying
employment relationship was not sufficiently contractual.98
Instead, it concluded that § 1981 did not operate to prevent a
racially motivated discharge because the employment
relationship did not include a provision regarding the term of
employment.94 In other words, the court suggested that to
challenge a racially motivated discharge under § 1981, an
employee must be able to show that-as a matter of contract
rather than statute-she had some protection against
termination. Without a durational term for § 1981 to modify, it
had no effect. Without contractual rights "regarding the term
of her employment," she could be laid off (and not recalled) on
the basis of race, as she could for any other reason.95
93 In fact, the court seemed to concede that prior Seventh Circuit precedent
treating at-will employment as contractual was correct. Id. at 1035 (discussing
McKmght v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990)).94 Id. at 1035.
95 Id. There is some division among the district courts m the Seventh Circuit
about whether to follow Gonzalez' dicta, but the majority have deviated from it, holding
that at-will employees are covered by § 1981. Compare Stone v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, 135 F Supp. 2d 873, 875-76 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (declining to follow Gonzaleg
dicta and holding that at-will employees are protected by § 1981) and Riad v. 520 S.
Mich. Ave. Assocs., 78 F Supp. 2d 748, 756-57 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (same) with Payne v.
Abbott Labs., No. 97-C-3822, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2443, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2,
1999) (declining to find at-will employees covered by § 1981 without additional




B. Federal Common Law, § 1988, and the Role of State
Law
The sole question in these cases is whether an at-will
employment relationship constitutes a "contract" for purposes
of § 1981.96 Because § 1981 contains no precise definition of
contract, courts have scrambled to come up with one. They
have looked primarily to state law to supply the needed
definition, without considering whether that is the appropriate
choice of law 97
1. Federal Common Law
How should courts determine whether the term
"contract," as used in § 1981, is broad enough to encompass at-
will employment relationships? One possibility is federal
common law Although modern law students are taught early
on that there is no such thing as general federal common law
under the doctrine of Erie v. Tompktns,98 there is still an
important role for federal common law 99 It is presumptively
the source of law to be used, for example, in defining the rights
and obligations of the federal government under nationwide
federal programs.100
96 Gonzalez takes a bifurcated approach, discussed supra, which asks
first whether there is an employment contract and second whether there is a
durational term that can be modified by § 1981. See Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034. One
commentator advocates this approach. See Hutchison, supra note 42, at 240-44.
97 See supra Part II.A.
98 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie and its progeny established the principle
that federal courts hearing cases premised on diversity jurisdiction must apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law. Id. at 78.
99 See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co.. 332 U.S. 301, 307-09 (1947)
(noting distinction between the specifics of federal common law eradicated by Erie and
those still alive and well afterward); see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 410 (1964).
1oo See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)
('The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are
governed by federal rather than local law."); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (stating that when Congress has not spoken about an
issue relating to a federal program, "Clearfield directs federal courts to fill the
interstices of federal legislation according to their own standards" (citing Clearfield,
318 U.S. at 367)).
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Federal common law is also presumptively the source of
law to determine the meaning of a federal statutory term.1 1 As
the Supreme Court explained in Misstssippt Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield,10 2 "[W]e start, however, with the general
assumption that 'in the absence of a plain indication to the
contrary, Congress when it enacts a statute is not making
the application of the federal act dependent on state law' "103
The preference for relying on federal rather than state
law to interpret federal statutes reflects the view that "federal
statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide
application."104 Relying on federal common law, the Supreme
Court has many times over interpreted a federal statutory
term in a way that is inconsistent with the law of the
particular state in which the case was brought.
For example, the Supreme Court in Holyfield
interpreted the word "domicile" in the Indian Child Welfare Act
("ICWA"), by reference to a uniform federal law, rather than
the law of the state where a protected child is located. 10 5 The
Court in that case was motivated by concerns about the lack of
uniformity that would result from reliance on state law
definitions of "domicile."'1 6 It would mean not only that
different Indian children were governed by different rules, but
that different rules might apply to the same child over time if
he was transported across state lines. 0 7
The Court in Holyfield also took into account its concern
about the relations between Indian families and state
authorities, noting that one of the primary purposes of the
ICWA was to prevent states from exercising jurisdiction over
some custody cases involving Indian children. 08 Allowing state
law to control the interpretation of a Congressional enactment
would potentially subvert the purpose behind it.
101 See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
43 (1989); see also generally RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 762-70 (4th ed. 1996).
102 490 U.S. 30.103 Id. at 43 (quoting Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)).
104 Id.
10 5 Id. at 47.
1 06 Id. at 43.




There are other examples as well. The Supreme Court
in Dzckerson v. New Banner Instztute'0 9 held that the term
"convicted," as used in the Gun Control Act of 1968, had to be
interpreted according to federal law even though the predicate
offense and pumshment were defined by state law Again,
uniformity was cited as the motivating force behind the
preference for federal over state law 110 Likewise the Court in
NLRB v. Hearst11' rejected an argument that the term
"employee," as used in the Wagner Act, should be defined by
state law As the Court explained, in the course of holding that
"employee" included independent contractors,
Both the terms and the purposes of the statute, as well as the
legislative history, show that Congress had in mind no
patchwork plan for securing freedom of employees' organization and
of collective bargaining. The Wagner Act is intended to solve a
national problem on a national scale Nothing in the statute's
background, history, terms or purposes indicates its scope is to be
limited by varying local conceptions, either statutory or judicial,
or that it is to be admnistered in accordance with whatever different
standards the respective states may see fit to adopt for the
disposition of unrelated, local problems. 112
A decision that federal law is controlling does not,
however, render state law irrelevant.118 Courts interpreting
federal statutory terms look first for their "ordinary meaning,"
in light of the "object and policy" of the statutory scheme. 114
State law may be important in determining the "ordinary
meamng" of the words used. 115 It may also be adopted as the
federal rule if necessary to preserve intrastate rule
109 460 U.S. 103 (1983).
10 Id. at 111-12.
" 322 U.S. Ill (1944).
112 Id. at 123. The Court's definition of "employee" was trumped three years
later when Congress, in the Taft-Hartley Act, expressly excluded independent
contractors from the definition. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act,
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
113 See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (explaining that although federal
law controls, the Court must still decide "whether to adopt state law or to fashion a
nationwide federal rule").
114 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 46 (1989).
115 Id. at 47 ('CThat we are dealing with a uniform federal rather than a state
definition does not, of course, prevent us from drawing on general state-law principles
to determine 'the ordinary meaning of the words used.' ").
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uniformity,116 to accommodate the interests of states more
generally, or if nationwide uniformity is not important. 117
Thus, in Reconstructwn Finance Corp. v. Beaver
County,118 the court defined "real property" as used in a federal
statute under state law Because the law permitted local
taxation of the covered property, which guaranteed different
approaches in different places, the presumption that Congress
intended nationwide uniformity was not warranted. 119 And
adopting state law as the federal rule of decision did not
threaten to frustrate any federal program. 120
The application of this body of law to our § 1981
question would point almost certainly to federal common law
as the source from which the definition of contract should be
drawn. Considerations of statutory purpose, the need for
uniformity, and Supreme Court precedent all confirm this
result.
A powerful case can be made that § 1981 is indeed a
statute that requires a controlling, uniform federal
interpretation. There is a strong tradition of federal
involvement in anti-discrimiation law, particularly in the
context of employment, where § 1981 is most frequently
invoked.'2 1 In fact, § 1981 was specifically enacted as an
antidote to the Black Codes of the southern states, designed to
prevent recently freed black men from realizing their rights. 122
Thus, the concerns present in Holyfield about states
mistreatimg the protected group may operate here as well.
Permittmg the rights of at-will employees to be determined by
116 See, e.g., Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 739 (resorting to state law regarding
the priority of liens arising from federal programs to avoid disrupting expectations
about priority from competing creditors).
117 See Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressinal
Silence: Using Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's Residual Statute of
Limitations, 107 YALE L.J. 393, 412 (1997) (noting view of some commentators that
"the interests of the states ordinarily deserve at least some consideration in the
decision whether to fashion federal common law").
118 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
119 Id. at 209.12 0 Id. at 210.
121 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123.
12 2 See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
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state law may undermine Congress' clear intent to provide full
and robust protection against race discrimination in
employment and elsewhere. 128
The Supreme Court has interpreted other statutory
terms in federal civil rights acts by reference to federal
common law For example, in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,
the Court relied on federal law to determine whether the term
"employer" encompassed supervisory employees. 124 In so doing,
the Court found state law and treatises, like the Second
Restatement of Agency, instructive but not dispositive. 121
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in two cases
involving reconstruction-era civil rights acts also rely primarily
on federal law in defimng statutory terms. First, in Patterson,
the case in which the Court limited § 1981 to pre-formation
conduct, the Supreme Court declined the Solicitor General's
invitation to interpret the "make and enforce" language of
§ 1981 according to state contract law The Court rejected the
view that § 1981 "has no actual substantive content, but
instead mirrors only the specific protections that are afforded
under the law of contracts of each state."126 The Court looked
instead to the plain meamng of the statute to ultimately
conclude that, as a matter of federal law, the "make and
enforce" language limited § 1981 to pre-formation conduct. 27
Second, and more recently, the Court in Haddle v.
Garrison128 took a similar approach to interpreting § 1985,
another civil rights act of the same era, which prohibits certain
conspiracies to deprive individuals of rights.129 In Haddle, the
123 See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 55 (1984) (noting the "central
objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes, which is to ensure that
individuals whose federal constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover
damages or secure injunctive relief').
124 See 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998); see also NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 123
(refusing to define "employee" as used in the Wagner Act according to state law
because it was designed to "solve a national problem on a national scale").
125 Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 754.
126 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 164. Specifically, the Solicitor General argued that
racial harassment should be actionable under § 1981 only if it amounted to a breach of
contract under state law. Id.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
128 525 U.S. 121 (1998).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1994). Section 1985 was originally enacted as the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 to make the Ku Klux Klan vulnerable to suit for its racially
motivated hostile acts. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 200 (1961).
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Court was asked to determine whether a retaliatory firng of
an at-will employee inflicted an injury to "person or property"
as required by § 1985. Although the meaning of "property" is
certainly something usually relegated to state law, the Court
looked at a variety of general sources, including treatises and
past federal decisions, to determine that an at-will employee
did possess a sufficient property interest to come within §
1985.130 The Court did refer to Georgia law, the state where the
case was brought, but did so only by way of example. 13 ' Thus,
although it did so without discussion, the Court made use of
federal common law and general principles of property law to
define the relevant term. Concerns about uniformity and the
relationship between states and their black citizens operate
with equal strength under § 1985 and § 1981.
2. The Relevance of 42 U.S.C. § 1988
The automatic resort to federal common law to interpret
§ 1981 is complicated, however, by another federal statute,
which directs courts interpreting the federal civil rights
statutes to look at state law in some circumstances. Section 3
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 stated that district court
jurisdiction to hear claims under § 1981
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far
as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States. 132
130 Haddle, 525 U.S. at 126.
131 Id. at 127.
132 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1994) (emphasis added). It is not just the existence of
§ 1988 that complicates matters, but also the utter clumsiness of the drafting. As
Justice Clifford once noted, § 1988 is "a mere jumble of Federal law, common law, and
State law, consisting of incongruous and irreconcilable regulations, which amounts
to no more than a direction to a judge [to conduct proceedings] as well as he can."
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 299 (1880) (Clifford, J., dissenting), quoted in
Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of
Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 501 (1980).
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Later codified as § 1988, and applied to all federal civil rights
acts, this provision has come to be used as a source of law
provision guiding enforcement of § 1981. Section 1981, like
other civil rights statutes of its era, is meagerly drafted. Even
as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it has no statute of
limitations. It has no express provision for damages. It says
nothing about whether claims survive a plaintiff's death. And,
relevant to our purposes here, it gives no definition of contract.
The question, then, is whether § 1988 authorizes or
requires that the definition of "contract" in § 1981 be gleaned
from state law That requires a determination that § 1988
applies in the first instance and that it mandates the
importation of state contract law into § 1981. At stake in this
issue is whether at-will employees in every state will be
protected against racially discriminatory discharges by § 1981,
or only in those states that treat at-will employment as a
contractual relationship. There are states that have refused to
view at-will employment relationships as contractual outside of
the § 1981 context. 133 And those federal courts that have
refused to apply § 1981 to at-will employees have done so
precisely because state law does not permit it. 134
The Supreme Court has been agnostic on the
appropriate breadth of § 1988, and academics have divergent
views on its meaning.135 It is clear that § 1988 neither creates
133 See, e.g., Thompson v. Bridgeport Hosp., No. CV 98352686, 2001 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 1755, at *17 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 18, 2001) (denying at-will
employee's breach of contract claim because under Connecticut law she was part of an
at-will employment relationship, but "not part of a contract'); McManus v. MCI
Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949 (D.C. 2000) (denying at-wiU employee's claim for
tortious interference with contract because she did not have a "contractual"
relationship).
134 See, e.g., Gatson v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 129 F Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla.
2001) (noting uncertainty under Florida law whether at-will employees have a
sufficiently contractual relationship to warrant protection under § 1981); Tucker v.
Cassiday, No. 99C4001, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9864, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2000)
(refusing to apply § 1981 to at-will employee because she was not wdrking pursuant to
a contract under Illinois law); Jones v. Becker Group, 38 F Supp. 2d 793, 796 (E.D.
Mo. 1999) (refusing to apply § 1981 to an at-will employee because Missouri law
requires a statement of duration as an "essential element to an employment contract"),
affd, No. 99-1827, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 38377 (8th Cir., Nov. 15, 1999).
135 See generally Jack M. Beerman, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with
Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989); Jennifer A. Coleman,
42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congressonally-Mandated Approach to the Construction of
Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REV. 665 (1986); Eisenberg, supra note 132; Seth F Krenner,
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an independent cause of action,136  nor authorizes the
"wholesale importation" of state causes of action into federal
law 137 But how far it does extend is unclear. The Court has, on
the one hand, interpreted it to leave almost no room for
principles of state law In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,188
for example, the Court construed § 1988 to mean that when a
federal civil rights statute is "deficient," the court has the
discretion to draw on either federal or state sources,
"whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal
statutes."139 Courts after Sullivan were barely nudged in the
direction of state law But a decade later, the Court decided
Robertson v. Wegmann,140 in which it read § 1988 as a
mandatory directive to courts to fill in all statutory gaps with
rules borrowed from state law 141 Robertson set the stage for a
more inclusive approach to state law 142
The Supreme Court has applied § 1988 to a § 1981 claim
only a handful of times. 143 In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court
refused to allow it to be used to authorize borrowing a state
rule that would have allowed fee-shifting in a § 1981 case.14
The Court next considered § 1988's relevance to § 1981 in
Burnett v. Grattan.145 In that case, the Court established a
three-step process to determine when and whether to borrow a
particular state rule under § 1988 and apply it to § 1981.146
The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 601 (1985); Wells, supra note 13.
13 6 See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 704 n.17 (1973).
137 See td. at 703-04.
138 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
13 9 Id. at 240.
140 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
14 1 Id. at 588.
142 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 132, at 502-07 (discussing tension
between Roberston and Sullivan).
143 See generally Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Burnett v.
Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 712-23
(1989).
144 427 U.S. at 184-85. Ironically, § 1988 was itself amended to add a provision
authorizing fee-shifting to prevailing plaintiffs under § 1981 and other civil rights
statutes. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2,
90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994 & Supp. V
1999)).
145 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
146 Id. at 47.
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First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as
such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights
statutes] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts
undertake the second step by considering application of state
"common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and
statutes" of the forum State. A third step asserts the predominance
of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not
"inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States."'
147
In short, this test asks: whether to resort to state law in the
first instance (deficiency); which rule of state law might be
applicable (relevancy); and, if there is a relevant rule, whether
it is consistent with federal law and policy (consistency).
In Burnett, the Court was considering whether to
borrow and apply an admimstrative statute of limitations from
Maryland law to an employee's § 1981 discrimination claim.14
Prior to Burnett, the Court had already sanctioned borrowing
state statutes of limitations because § 1981 does not contain its
own. 149 Section 1981 is arguably "deficient" with respect to a
limitations period, and, the Supreme Court held, § 1988
authorizes the use of state law to remedy such a deficiency
Thus, the real issue in Burnett was whether this was
the appropriate state rule to govern claims under § 1981-a
question of relevancy The Court rejected the administrative
statute of limitations because, under the second step of the
Court's test, there were more closely analogous rules. The
Court found the three-year personal injury statute of
limitations in Maryland law more appropriate. 150 The result of
the Court's approach in Burnett is that § 1981 plaintiffs in
different states may be governed by different statutes of
limitations. 151 The cases on at-will employment under § 1981
147 Id. at 47-48 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1982)).
148 Id. at 46.
149 Id. at 49.
150 Burnett, 468 U.S. at 46 n.8.
15i The potentially great state variation was limited by later cases holding
that courts must apply the state's general personal injury statute of limitations to
federal civil rights acts claims, "whether or not the state itself would characterize the
action as a personal injury claim." Beerman, supra note 135, at 58; see also Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985) (federal interest in uniformity requires that
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do not seem to implicate the relevancy question because in
most states there are not competing rules about whether to
treat at-will employment as contractual. But the deficiency and
consistency prongs of the Burnett test are both raised.
a. Does § 1988 Apply9
Before reaching the other prongs of the Burnett test, it
must intially be determined that the federal statute is
"deficient." Without a deficiency, § 1988 does not authorize the
incorporation of state law and a consideration of other factors
becomes superfluous. 152
Whether an at-will employee is protected by § 1981
turns on the meaning of the federal statutory term "contract."
Is § 1981 "deficient" in failing to precisely define contract? If
not, § 1988 does not apply and the conventional rules
governing federal statutory interpretation apply instead.
There are some strong arguments that § 1988 does not
apply to the question raised by Lauture-whether at-will
employees are protected by § 1981 from race discrimination in
employment-or to related questions. Section 1988 itself refers,
to the inability of federal law to "furmsh suitable remedies." 153
Commentators have noted that § 1988 has in fact, whether by
design or inadvertence, only been applied to remedial and
enforcement provisions of the federal civil rights acts.154 While
the Supreme Court has never expressly said § 1988 should be
so limited, it has only been applied, in the § 1981 context, to fill
gaps relating to damages, 155 survival of actions, 156 and statutes
courts rely on general personal injury limitations period for federal civil rights claims);
Okure v. Owens, 488 U.S. 235, 249 (1989) (rejecting argument that court should apply
state's shorter intentional tort limitations period because doing so would be
inconsistent with § 1983's "broad scope").
152 See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) (refusing to resort
to state law on question of availability of punitive damages because federal civil rights
act was not "deficient').153 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
154 Beerman, supra note 135, at 58. One commentator, Theodore
Eisenberg, argued that § 1988 should only be applied in cases that have been removed
from state court pursuant to the civil rights removal provisions. See Eisenberg, supra
note 132. That approach has not carried the day.
155 See, e.g., Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 239-40 (suggesting that § 1988 authorizes




of limitations. 157 These deficiencies all arguably relate to
remedies and enforcement, whereas the definition of "contract"
clearly relates to a substantive provision of § 1981.
If § 1988 applies, it is also curious that it was not
mentioned in either Haddle or Patterson. In Haddle, the Court
was grappling with an almost identical problem under
§ 1985-whether at-will employees had a sufficient property
interest to be hurt by a conspiratorial firing within the
meaning of the statute. 58 Section 1988 clearly applies
generally to § 1985,159 which used terms it failed to define. Yet
the Supreme Court made no reference to a § 1988 deficiency in
analyzing the plaintiffs claim. It instead assumed that general
principles of tort law-without dependence upon the law of any
particular state-could guide their analysis.
The Court was similarly undetained by § 1988 in
Patterson. In interpreting the "make and enforce" language of
§ 1981, it paid attention to congressional intent, statutory
structure, and general principles, which led to the narrow
interpretation discussed above. Again, the Court made no
mention of § 1988 or a statutory deficiency, completely ignoring
§ 1988.160 These are only two examples of times the Supreme
Court has ignored "the potential application of § 1988 to other
aspects of civil rights actions that are not directly addressed by
federal law "161
The meaning of the term "contract" in § 1981 is a very
similar issue to those raised in Haddle and Patterson. Thus one
might expect § 1988 to be similarly inapplicable.
156 See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (applying Louisiana
survivorship law to § 1983 claim pursuant to § 1988).
157 See, e.g., Burnett, 468 U.S. 42 (applying state statute of limitations to §
1981 claim pursuant to § 1988).
158 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998).
159 See Moor, 411 U.S. at 702 (section 1988 is "intended to complement the
various acts which do create federal causes of action for the violation of federal civil
rights," including § 1985).
160 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 183. There are other examples as well. In defining
"person" for purposes of § 1983, the Supreme Court made no reference to § 1988 on
state law at all. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
1S D. Bruce LaPierre, Enforcement of Judgments Against States & Local
Governments: Judicial Control Over the Power to Tax, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299, 404
n.639 (1993) (noting other examples, such as the doctrine of official immunity under
§ 1983, where § 1988 was not invoked despite an apparent statutory deficiency).
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Finally, a review of § 1988 cases reveals that it is only
used when the court finds abject silence on a seemingly
important or necessary issue. Section 1981's failure to contain
any statute of limtations is one example. 162 It is virtually
inconceivable that the Court would allow a cause of action that
allowed significant money damages to exist without a
limitations period. Thus § 1988 was necessary as a gap-filler.
The failure to state whether "contract" includes at-will
employment relationships does not create such a deafening
silence; thus, the role for § 1988 is not as obvious.
b. Does § 1988 Authorize the Adoption of
State Contract Law9
Even if § 1988 does apply to the at-will question because
§ 1981 is deficient in failing to define "contract," there is still
an additional step before state law may be used to supply the
definition. Each state rule that is borrowed pursuant to the
authority of § 1988 must also be tested for consistency with
overarching federal law and policy. Courts in many
circumstances have refused to apply particular state rules
because, under the Burnett test, they are inconsistent with
federal law 163
There are two potential inconsistencies in this context.
First, if the law of a particular state refused to treat an at-will
employment relationship as contractual, 164 thereby depriving
such employees of the protection of § 1981, it would be
inconsistent with federal law because, as explained in Part III
below, federal common law principles support the treatment of
at-will employment as contractual.
162 See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 42.
163 See, e.g, UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1966) (refusing
to consider state law where it would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying
the cause of action); Hardin v. CNA Ins. Cos., 103 F Supp. 2d 1091, 1097 (S.D. Ind.
1999) (applying federal common law to determine the date on which the statute of
limitations for a § 1981 claim begins to run); Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F Supp.
1074, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (refusing to apply California's survivorship law to a § 1983
claun because it was inconsistent with the broad, compensatory purposes of the federal
civil rights laws).
164 See supra note 133.
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Second, because incorporation of state law creates the
possibility that § 1981 will mean different things for different
people, it may be inconsistent with the federal policy of strong,
uniform enforcement of § 1981 and other statutes prohibiting
employment discrimmation. 165 If nationwide uniformity in
interpretation is important to make the statute meaningful,
state law should be looked to in fashiomng a federal rule of
decision rather than expressly incorporated. 166 That way,
federal law can give effect to well-established state law
principles accepted by a majority of states without giving
unnecessarily subversive power to rogue states with different
ideas.
In the end, the back-and-forth between federal and
state law should operate under § 1988 much as it does outside
it. That is, even where state law is not expressly adopted, it
may be persuasive in fashiomng the federal rule. Arguably the
only relevance of making the threshold determination whether
§ 1988 applies is to gauge whether the presumption is in favor
of federal law or state law If § 1988 does not apply, federal law
is presumptively controlling unless special circumstances make
state law more appropriate. If § 1988 does apply, state law is
presumptively operative unless it is inconsistent with federal
law With respect to the question of § 1981's applicability to at-
will employment, the better approach is to leave § 1988 out of
it.
III. WHY § 1981 SHOULD APPLY TO AT-WILL EMPLOYEES: A
CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
Both state and federal common law ultimately provide
the same conclusion to the question whether at-will employees
should be protected by § 1981. An examination of state contract
165 See supra notes 111-12, 123-24 and accompanying text.
166 Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43-45 ('The cases in which we have found
that Congress intended a state-law definition of a statutory term have often been those
where uniformity clearly was not intended."); Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 ("federal
programs that 'by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the
Nation' necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules" (quoting United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966))); Basista, 340 F.2d at 86 C"Federal common law must
be applied to effect uniformity, otherwise the Civil Rights Acts would fail to effect the
purposes and ends which Congress intended.").
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law and commentary, as well as federal decisions, reveals that
the four circuits who agreed that at-will employees deserve
protection were correct. This Part explains why
A. Basic Contract Law Prnctples
There are two potential doctrines implicated in the
effort to describe an at-will employment relationship as
contractual: mutuality of obligation and defimteness.
1. Mutuality of Obligation
A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which
the law in some way recognizes as a duty 167 Promises are
enforceable (i.e., the law gives a remedy for their breach) when
they are supported by legally sufficient consideration.
Under traditional consideration theory, a promise that
is illusory-one that takes the form of a promise, but does not
in fact oblige the promisor to do anythmg-is not sufficient
consideration for a return promise or performance. 168 An
agreement premised on one illusory promise is said to lack
mutuality of obligation-a fancy way of saying one party's
promise is not supported by consideration-and is therefore
unenforceable. An agreement premised on two illusory
promises simply lacks consideration and is also unenforceable.
At-will employment is vulnerable to this characterization if one
views the employer's promise as a promise to pay for services
unless he chooses not to (and terminates the employee), and
the employee's promise as a promise to work unless he chooses
not to (and qits).
Modern courts, however, are slow to invalidate
contracts based on a lack of mutuality, resorting instead to
legal fictions to save agreements that are, in practice, useful.
For example, a requirements contract, pursuant to which a
167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
168 See generally JOSEPH M. PERiLLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.17 (rev. ed.
1993) (describing ilusory promises) [hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS];
RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, at § 77, cmt. a CWhere the apparent assurance of
performance is illusory, it is not consideration for a return promise.").
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buyer agrees to buy all the widgets he needs from a single
seller, lacks mutuality in the traditional sense because if he
does not need any, he need not buy any The buyer, then, has
not obligated himself to do anything in exchange for the seller's
promise to make adequate supplies available.
The needs of the modern economy have forced courts to
relax the requirement of mutuality Many businesses are
unable to forecast their precise needs or output and, therefore,
depend on requirements and outputs contracts.
Accommodating this need, courts today uniformly agree that
these are valid, enforceable contracts. 169 How do they justify
this result?
One way to validate requirements and outputs contracts
is to look harder for consideration. Courts nght ask whether
there is anything the buyer could do to breach the contract-a
backwards way of assessing whether he has obligated hnnself
to do anything. The answer for a requirements contract is that
the buyer can breach the contract by buying some of his
requirements from a second seller. He has, therefore, made a
non-illusory promise, which can serve as consideration for the
seller's promise. Courts will look hard to find express or
implied limits on the promisor's putative free-way-out of the
contract, 170 and almost any limit is sufficient to render a
promise non-illusory 171
169 See, e.g., McMichael v. Price, 58 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1936) (finding a promise to
purchase all the sand he needed for his business non-illusory, despite the fact that the
buyer could go out of business and evade his promise without penalty). See also U.C.C.
§ 2-306 cmt. 2 (1988) ('CUnder tins Article, a contract for output or requirements [does
not] lack mutuality of obligation since, under this section, the party who will determine
quantity is required to operate his plant or conduct ins business in good faith and
according to commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade so that his output or
requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure.").
170 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917)
(finding an implied promise of best efforts on the part of the marketer to save an
exclusive dealing contract); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, at § 77 cmt. d (A
limitation on the promisor's freedom of choice need not be stated in words. It may be an
implicit term of the promise, or it may be supplied by law."); see U.C.C. § 2-306 (2)
(1988) C'A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for exclusive dealing in
the kind of goods concerned imposes unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller
to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to promote
their sale.").
171 See RESTATEMENT supra note 167, at § 77, cmt. b, illus. 5 (right of
termination conditioned upon thirty-days notice makes promise non-illusory because
promisor is bound to terms of the contract for at least thirty days).
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Apply the same analysis to at-will employment
agreements. The employer can breach the agreement by
refusing to pay for services already rendered. His promise is,
then, not entirely illusory But the same cannot be said about
the employee. There is nothing the employee could do that
would enable the employer to sue to enforce the contract. Thus,
the use of implied limitations to remedy the lack of mutuality
does not work in this context.
But the late Arthur Corbin, one of the preeminent
contracts scholars, characterized the at-will employment
arrangement differently The employer is the offeror to a
unilateral contract (promise exchanged for performance rather
than a return promise).172 And although he can withdraw the
offer at any time, the terms of the employer's offer obligate him
to pay for any service rendered by the employee.173
The employee, for his part, has not obligated himself to
do anything, since he can perform or not perform under the
terms of the offer.174 But unilateral contracts do not, by
definition, require mutuality of obligation. 7 5 The offeree is
always free to make the choice between performance and non-
performance. Corbin's analysis thus supports the conclusion
that an at-will employment arrangement is indeed contractual.
2. Definiteness
Another stumbling block for at-will employment is the
doctrine of definiteness, which states that the material terms
of a contract must be specified with certainty in order for the
agreement to be valid.176 The argument is that an at-will
172 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 168, at 213.
173 See id.
174 See gd.
175 The requirement of mutuality is, even outside of this context, losing its
hold on contract law. The Restatement ostensibly denounces it, though it mimics the
requirement in other ways. RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, at § 79; see, e.g., td. at § 7;
see also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 168, at 224 (agreeing with a recent case
advocating for the "interment' of the principle of mutuality and all the rules that flow
from it).
176 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, at § 33(1) (1979) C(Even though a
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be




employment relationship cannot be a valid contract because it
does not specify a term of duration. The counterargument is
that the relationship can be characterized as a contract of
indefinite duration, which is valid despite the lack of a specific
term regarding length.
Several courts have relied on the Second Restatement of
Contracts ("Second Restatement") to support their conclusion
that at-will employment is contractual. Although the
illustration cited does not obviously support that proposition,'77
the Second Restatement may be read more generally to support
the characterization of at-will employment as a contract of
indefinite duration. Section 33 of the Second Restatement,
which addresses contracts with uncertain terms, uses an
illustration of A's promise to serve as B's chauffeur in exchange
for $100 per month. The contract is silent as to duration.
According to the Second Restatement, this agreement is
presumed to be a contract for one month, and, absent
revocation, renewed at the end of each month. This
characterization saves the indefinite contract unless, the
illustration states, circumstances "show that such an
agreement merely specifies the rate of compensation for an
employment at will."178 The question is whether the carve-out
for at-will employment means it is not an enforceable contract,
or that it is valid but the parties are not bound to continue
performance a month at a time. Ultimately, this illustration
does little to advance the analysis of whether the at-will
employment relationship qualifies as a contract.
Comment (d) to § 33 of the Second Restatement does,
however, seem to suggest that a truly at-will arrangement
qualifies as a contract. "Valid contracts are often made which
do not specify the time for performance. When the contract
calls for successive performances but is indefinite in duration,
it is commonly terminable by either party, with or without a
requirement of reasonable notice.""79 This provision, of course,
'77 See, e.g., Lauture, 216 F.3d at 262 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, at
§ 33 cmt. d, illus. 6 for the proposition that an at-will employment agreement is
enforceable as a contract of indefinite duration); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165
F.3d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
'78 RESTATEMENT, supra note 167, at § 33 cmt. d, illus. 6
279 Id. § 33 cmt. d.
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suggests that an at-will employment relationship, which fits
this description, is a valid contract.
But in other instances, the Second Restatement wavers
in its commitment to the notion that at-will employment is
contractual by refusing to apply general rules of contract. For
example, in § 188, which deals with the validity of non-compete
clauses, comment (g) off-handedly describes "the case of
employment at will," as one where "no contract of employment
is involved."180
The Uniform Commercial Code, though not applicable
to employment contracts, recogmzes an arrangement akin to
at-will employment as a valid contract. Section 2-309 provides
that "[w]here the contract provides for successive performances
but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable tne but
unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time by
either party "181
Taken together, most general commentary seems to
accept the notion that an at-will employment arrangement can
be a valid contract, even though it sometimes has to stretch
basic principles of contract law to reach that conclusion.
B. State Contract Law
State courts are not, of course, always restrained by
basic principles of contract law In a variety of contexts,
without much discussion of contract doctrine, courts have
assumed that at-will employment relationships are contractual
in nature.
There has been considerable litigation about whether
employee manuals and handbooks devolve rights on employees.
With respect to at-will employees, this issue arises when a
handbook outlines disciplinary procedures that include, for
example, hearings and other incidents of due process. The at-
will employee, in receipt of such a document, tries to argue that
the employer's right of termination-a central incident of the
at-will relationship-is now limited. For an employee who is
terminable at-will, courts take one of two approaches to
determining whether the employer is bound to follow the
18 0 Id. § 188 cmt. g.
181 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-309(2) (2001).
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procedures--or, in the alternative, is free to fire at will. Some
courts ask whether the handbook creates an employment
contract that limits the employer's ability to terminate the
employee without adhering to the process outlined in the
handbook.18 2 With this approach, the nature of the underlying
at-will relationship without the benefit of the handbook is
irrelevant.
But other courts ask, instead, whether the handbook
adds a term to an existing contractual, albeit terminable-at-
will relationship. The effect of a handbook, then, may be to
modify or change the existing contractual relationship. 183
Implicit in this approach is an acknowledgment that an at-will
employment relationship is contractual, despite the fact that
the right not to rbe terminated is not one of the contract's
terms. 184
Courts have also broached the issue of how to
characterize the contractual status of at-will employment for
tort law purposes. Specifically, they have considered whether
an at-will employee can bring a suit alleging tortious
interference with a contract, which includes, as an element of
proof, that a valid contract exists. Several courts have
permitted at-will employees to maintain a tortious interference
claim, 8 5 though some apply a higher standard to such
182 See, e.g., Jackson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 685 A.2d 1329, 1334 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (stating that an employee handbook can, depending on
certain criteria, create an implied contract of employment that protects an at-will
employee).
183 One of the niceties of contract law ignored by most of these cases is that a
handbook given after employment has begun is not supported by consideration because
the employee has given nothing in return. Thus, a pure contract analysis would never
enforce promises made therein. The unilateral contract analysis, discussed supra,
might save such promises, however. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 168,
at § 6.2 ('where the employer promise[s] job security through restrictions on the power
to terminate the employment, the employee's services provide consideration for a
unilateral contract').
184 See, e.g., Shelby v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 842 F Supp. 999, 1006 (M.D.
Tenn. 1993) (recognizing that "an employee handbook may, under certain
circumstances, become a part of the contract" for an at-will employee).
185 See, e.g., Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 276 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding an at-
will employee's clain for tortious interference actionable); Terhune v. Frank, 1993 WL
316006 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 1993) (same); Nelson v. Fleet Nael Bank, 949 F Supp.
254, 261 (D. Del. 1996) (predicting that Delaware would recognize a tortious
interference claim brought by an at-will employee); Keith v. Mendus, 661 N.E.2d 26,
32-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (same); GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim
Servs., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ('It is well established that the
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clains. 186 Implicit in these cases again is recognition of the
underlying relationship as being contractual in nature.
At-will employees have also been perntted to sue their
employers for breach of contract. Termination without cause is
not, of course, a breach of an at-will employment agreement,
but the failure to pay wages or promised benefits may be.187
This approach is consistent with the Second Restatement,
which defines a contract as "a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy "1 88 By allowing an employee to
bring a breach-of-contract action, courts are recognizing that
the relationship is contractual, despite the lack of guarantees
about duration. In miscellaneous other contexts as well, courts
have treated at-will employment as a contract or made
pronouncements about the contractual nature of the
relationship. 89
at-will nature of a contract does not preclude a tortious interference claim"). But see
Kadco Contract Design Corp. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 489, 494 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (refusing to recognize a claim of tortious interference by an at-will employee);
Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 878-79 (Ill. 1991) (recognizing an at-will
employee's claim for tortious interference with a "legitimate expectancy of continued
employment," but not with a contract).
186 See, e.g., Water Dev. Co. v. Bd. of Water Works, 488 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa
1992) (requiring a showing of "substantial evidence of a predominant motive on the
part of [the defendant] to terminate the [contract] for improper reasons").
187 See, e.g., Lane v. Ogden Entme't, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1272 (MD. Ala.
1998) (permitting the plaintiff to bring a § 1981 claim for failure to receive a
promotion).
188 RESATFENT, supra note 167, at § 1.
189 See, e.g., McKnight, 908 F.2d at 109 (Employment at will is not a state of
nature but a continuing contractual relation."); EEOC v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 874 F
Supp. 92, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding an implied duty of good faith inherent in every
contract, including those for at-will employment); Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr.,
Inc., 614 A-2d 1021, 1030 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) ("In Maryland, at-will employment
is a contract of indefinite duration that can be terminated at the pleasure of either
party at any time."); Fortune v. Nael Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56
(Mass. 1977) (same). Many courts have permitted at-will employees to bring a claim for
fraudulent inducement-typically a contract formation defense-when the employer
led them to accept the position through misrepresentations. Implicit in the recognition
of this defense, again, is the contractual nature of the at-will employment
arrangement. See, e.g., Franz v. Iolab, Inc., 801 F Supp. 1537, 1542 (E.D. La. 1992).
Under the Texas Whistleblower Act, at-will employees have been held to work under




C. The Supreme Court on Contracts
The Supreme Court has implicitly resolved the question
whether § 1981 applies to at-will employees on two separate
occasions. First, in Patterson itself, the plaintiff was an at-will
employee. 190 Although the Court used her case as an
opportumty to limit § 1981's applicability to contract
formation, it implicitly recognized that the underlying
employment relationship was contractual in nature. Recall
that in Patterson the Court hinted that the plaintiffs failure-
to-promote claim might fall within the newly constricted § 1981
if it involved formation of a "new and distinct relation,"'191 or, in
other words, if the employer's action could be fairly described
as a "refusal to enter the new contract."19 2 Implicitly, the Court
was treating the underlying at-will relationship as a contract,
and the putative promotion as a new contract.
Then, in 1998, the Court decided Haddle v. Garrison,193
a case involving the scope of another federal civil rights
statute, § 1985.194 Section 1985 protects against conspiracies to
deprive individuals of their civil rights. The question presented
in Haddle was whether it could be used by an at-will employee
to challenge a conspiratorial firing.195 At issue was the
requirement of § 1985 that the plaintiff suffer "actual injury" to
"person or property" The employer argued (and the district
and appellate courts agreed) that because an at-will employee
has no right against termination, he suffers no such injury
when he is fired, regardless of whether it was induced by a
prohibited conspiracy 196
The Court looked to tort law to determine whether an
at-will employee deprived of employment suffers actual harm.
Relying primarily on a treatise, it concluded that malicious or
other wrongful discharge by an employer could be actionable,
190 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
191 Id. at 185.
192 Id.
193 525 U.S. 121, 126 (1998).194 See supra notes 128-31, 158-59 and accompanying text.
195 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his employer conspired to have him
fired from his job in retaliation for obeying a grand jury subpoena. Haddle, 525 U.S. at
122. 196 Id. at 123-24.
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regardless of "whether the employment was for a fixed term
not yet expired or is terminable at the will of the employer."'9 7
But the Court stopped short of holding, as a matter of federal
law, that an at-will employment relationship is strictly
contractual. Instead, it described Haddle's claim as "a species
of the traditional torts of intentional interference with
contractual relations and intentional interference with
prospective contractual relations."'198
It is true that at-will employees might be able to
maintain a tort claim in some states for third-party
interference without showing that the underlying relationship
qualifies as a contract. The cause of action in many states
includes interference with a prospective business relation as
well as a contract per se. And for purposes of § 1985, the Court
needed only to find that the plaintiff had some interest that
could be tortiously interfered with, not necessarily that the
interest was contractual in nature. But the case the Court
primarily relied on to illustrate this point in fact recognized
that an at-will employee has a "valuable contract right."199 The
Court's analysis thus provides some additional support for the
conclusion that at-will employment relationships are
contractual.
The bulk of the authority supports the same conclusion:
at-will employees function in a contractual relationship with
their employers that is sufficient to render them protected by
§ 1981.
IV WHY § 1981 MATTERS
Whether § 1981 applies to at-will employees is a matter
of some significance. A majority of American employees work
at-will.200 Forty states recognize at-will employment,201 and
197 Id. at 126 (quoting 2 THOMAS COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 589-591 (3d
ed. 1906)).19 8 Id. at 126.
19 9 Id. at 127 (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442, 444 (1978)).
200 See John P Frantz, Market Ordering Versus Statutory Control
of Termination Decisions: A Case for the Inefficiency of Just Cause Dismissal
Requirements, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 556 (1997) ("Since the start of the
twentieth century, the majority of employment relationships in the United States have
been governed by the common law employment-at-will presumption.").
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most of those indulge a presumption of at-will employment in
the absence of clear evidence that the parties agreed to a
specific term of employment.2 2 Section 1981's applicability to
those workers is not, then, something to be ignored. But given
the often parallel protection provided by Title VII, the need for
§ 1981 is worth further consideration. This Part looks first at
doctrinal similarities and differences between the two statutes,
and then at some empirical evidence about how § 1981 is
actually used in practice.
A. A Statutory Comparison
1. Coverage
For some at-will employees, § 1981 provides the only
available protection against race discrimination in
employment. Title VII applies only to employers that have at
least fifteen full-time employees. 203 Based on extrapolation
from census data, nineteen percent of the American workforce
is not covered by Title VII.20 4 But even where employees have
201 See Gary Minda, Employment At Will in the Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L
REV. 913, 915 (1986); see also Hutchison, supra note 42, at 208.
202 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034 C'Under Illinois law, an employer-
employee relationship without an explicit durational term is presumed to be an at-will
relationship.").
203 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Title VII is of course broader than § 1981
in that it protects against discrimination on bases other than race. See &d. at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(i).
204 This method for determining the number of employees without Title VII
protection is borrowed from Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of
Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 602, n.42 (1988). The authors of that article
conducted a comprehensive study of § 1981 litigation, discussed supra. Their method,
which in 1988 led them to estimate that fourteen percent of the workforce and eighty-
six percent of employers are covered by § 1981 but not Title VII, is based on census
data. County business patterns data lists the number of employees who work for
different size employers as well as the number of employers who have different
numbers of employees. Because a single category includes employers with ten to
nineteen employees, they added the number of employers with fewer than ten
employees and half of the employers from the category "ten to nineteen employees" to
estimate the number of Title VII-covered employers. Using that same approach, I
estimate that in 1999, nineteen percent of employees (21 million workers) and eighty
percent of employers are not covered by Title VII. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, County Business Patterns 1999, at 3 (2001), available at
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protection under both § 1981 and Title VII, there are other
meaningful differences that make § 1981 important.
2. Administrative Exhaustion
Section 1981 claims are not subject to any
administrative exhaustion requirements, unlike those brought
under Title VII. Title VII plaintiffs must first file complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") or a state work-sharing organization, give the EEOC
the opportunity to investigate and urge conciliation of the
claims, and then wait for EEOC permission to sue. Only then
can a Title VII plaintiff turn to a court for relief.20 5 Claims
under § 1981, in contrast, can be brought directly to court. The
ability of plaintiffs alleging race discrimination to bypass the
EEOC's conciliation scheme simply by bringing their
complaints under § 1981 prompted the Supreme Court to take
a serious look at whether § 1981 ought to apply to employment
discrimination. But, in Railway Express, the Court
acknowledged the overlap and its potential to undermine Title
VIrs administrative scheme, but nonetheless permitted
plaintiffs to continue pursuing either or both avenues of
relief.206
3. Statutes of Limitations
Title VII requires that plaintiffs file complaints with the
EEOC within either 180 or 300 days, depending on whether
the complaint goes to the EEOC directly or to a state work-
sharing organization, respectively 20 7 Section 1981, in contrast,
does not impose a particular statute of limitations. The
http:lwww.census.gov/prod-/2001pubsCbp99/cbp99-I.pdf. (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
206 421 U.S. at 461. Although § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that
damages under Title VII can be recovered only if the complainant "cannot recover"
under § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(1) (1994), the EEOC has taken the position that it
bars double recovery for the same injury, but not the simultaneous pursuit of claims
under both statutes. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AVAILABLE UNDER § 102 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 (July 14, 1992)
(interpreting "cannot recover" language of § 1981A).
207 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994).
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Supreme Court has held that § 1981 claims should be governed
by state law,208 and that the most analogous limitations period
is the one that governs residual or general personal injury
rather than intentional torts.209 In many states, this approach
means that the statute of limitations under § 1981 is
considerably longer than that under Title VII.210 In Patterson,
for example, the plaintiff pursued her claim under § 1981
precisely because she filed too late to bring it under Title
VII.211
4. Proof Structure
Under Title VII, there are two proof structures plaintiffs
use to show disparate treatment discrimination. The first is a
pretext model, which requires the plaintiff to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination. To support a claim of a racially
motivated failure-to-hire, the plaintiff must prove: (i) he
belongs to a racial minority; (ii) he applied for and was
qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (iii) though
qualified, he was rejected for the position; and (iv) thereafter,
the employer continued to seek applicants with complainant's
qualifications. 212 The employer then bears a burden of
production-which requires it to come forth with legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. The plaintiff, who
has at all times retained the burden of proof, can win the case
either by disproving the reason proffered by the employer or
introducing other evidence of discrmination.2 13 The jury then
208 See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987) (holding that
§ 1981 claims are governed by the limitations period prescribed for personal injury
under state law); see also supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
209 See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989); see supra notes 150-51 and
accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., Morse v. Univ. of Vt., 973 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting
that § 1981 claims in New York are governed by the three-year personal injury statute
of limitations); Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying
Connecticut's three-year personal injury statute of limitations to § 1981 claim). The
statute of limitations under § 1981 is not, however, tolled by filing an administrative
claim with the EEOC under Title VII. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454 (1975).
211 See 805 F.2d at 1144 n.* ("presumably for statute of limitations reasons,
Patterson did not assert a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
212 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
213 Id. at 802-03.
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has the opportumty to decide whether or not the employer
violated Title VII.214 Following the Supreme Court's lead
in Patterson,215 most courts have applied this proof structure to
§ 1981 claims as well.216
Title VII also allows a plaintiff with some direct
evidence of discrimination to proceed under an alternative
proof structure, labeled "mixed-motive." Faced with the
plaintiffs evidence that race was "a motivating factor" in the
adverse employment decision, the employer must prove (not
just produce evidence) that it would have made the same
decision even if race had not been a factor. 217 Imtially, this
showing by the employer was sufficient to avoid liability
entirely 218 But Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to provide
that an employer who succeeds in that endeavor is still liable
for committing discrimination, but can avoid paying money
damages for its violation.219 The plaintiff can still seek
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees as
the "prevailing party"
Although it seems clear that § 1981 plaintiffs may rely
on a mixed-motive theory to prove discrimination,220 it is not
clear whether the pre- or post-1991 rules regarding liability
and available remedies will be applied. The Civil Rights Act of
1991, which changed the mixed-motive proof structure, did not
explicitly amend § 1981. Most circuits, therefore, continue to
hold that a defendant who makes the appropriate showing will
be excused from both liability and damages. 221  Such
214 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000).
215 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (applying
the pretext proof structure to an employment discrimination claim brought under
§ 1981).
216 See, e.g., Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2001);
Bass v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 242 F.3d 996 (iith Cir. 2001).
217 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(m) (1994).
2 18 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989).
219 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
220 This assumption comes from Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977). a decision which permits § 1983 defendants to prove that a
challenged employment action would have been taken for legitimate reasons separate
and apart from any discriminatory motive.
221 See, e.g., Pulliam v. Tallapoosa County Jail, 185 F.3d 1182, 1184 (11th Cir.
1999). But see Lewis v. American Foreign Serv. Ass'n, 846 F Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1993)
(holding that CRA 1991 provisions regarding remedies in mixed-motive cases are
applicable to § 1981 claims).
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an interpretation makes § 1981 a less desirable cause of action
for mixed-motive plaintiffs.
5. Remedies
Plaintiffs who prevail under § 1981 are entitled to
equitable relief and monetary damages. 222 Although Title VII
plaintiffs are now entitled to these same types of remedies,223
some meaningful differences remain. Damages under Title VII,
for example, are capped according to the size of the defendant
employer.224 Damages under § 1981 are not similarly limited,225
and awards of backpay are not limited under § 1981 to two
years, as they are under Title VII.226
There may also remain some differences in the
availability of punitive damages under the two statutes. Under
§ 1981a, the statutory provision making monetary damages
available for violations of Title VII, punitive damages may be
awarded when plaintiff shows "that the respondent engaged in
a discriminatory practice with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual."22 7 In 1999, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1981a
to provide an additional limitation on punitive damages. In
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,228 the Court held that
punitive damages may not be inposed where liability is
vicarious based on the acts of a supervisor or agent whose
discriminatory or harassing conduct is contrary to the
employer's efforts to comply with Title VII.229
Section 1981a does not expressly amend § 1981. Prior to
1991, courts were deeply divided about the proper standard for
punitive damages under § 1981, a statute with no separate
222 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460 (section 1981 plaintiffs are "entitled to both
equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances,
punitive damages").
223 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1994).
224 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). Title VII plaintiffs won a recent victory in
Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 532 U.S. 843 (2001), in which the Supreme Court
held that awards of front pay were not subject to the statutory cap on damages.
225 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4) (1994).
226 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460.
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
228 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
229 Id. at 540-46.
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provision governing punitive damages. Some courts required
evidence of some egregious misconduct, beyond mere
intentional discrimination, to justify an award of punitive
damages. 230 Others found that simple proof of intentional
discrimination, a mere violation of the statute, is sufficient to
put the request for punitive damages to the jury 23 1 But at least
one of the latter cases was overruled in light of Kolstad.23 2
Whether Kolstad will umversally be understood to limit claims
for punitive damages under § 1981, too, is unclear.
6. Jury Trials
The jury trial right for § 1981 plaintiffs is rooted in the
Seventh Amendment, which preserves the right to trial by jury
in "suits at common law."23 Claims brought under § 1981 fall
within that category 23 4 Prior to 1991, Title VII plaintiffs were
not entitled to a jury trial because the relief available to them
was exclusively equitable.23 5 But the Civil Rights Act of 1991
made it possible for victims of intentional discrimination to
seek monetary damages-legal relief-and concomitantly
granted them a right to jury trial.26 Thus, today, there is no
meaningful difference in the jury trial right under either
statute.
230 See, e.g., Hampton v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1115 (10th
Cir. 2001) ("the standard for punitive damages for discrimination [under § 1981] is that
the discrimination must have been malicious, willful, and in gross disregard of
plaintiffs rights") (quoting Jackson v. Pool Mortgage Co., 868 F.2d 1178, 1181 (10th
Cir. 1989)); Stephens v. S. Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 1988)
(requiring discrimination that "constitutes reprehensible and abhorrent conduct');
Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-Province, 816 F.2d 1104, 1109 (6th Cir. 1987) (punitive
damages are generally "limited to cases involving egregious conduct or a showing of
willfulness or malice on the part of the defendant).
231 See, e.g., Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 1987)
(requirimg only proof of "intentional wrongdoing"), overruled in part, Iacobucci v.
Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999).
232 See Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 27 (overruling Rowlett to the extent it made
punitive damages available under § 1981 based solely on intentional wrongdoing).
233 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S.
545, 550 (1990).
234 Id. at 550 (assuming that claims brought under § 1981 are legal in nature
and, therefore, deserving of a right to jury trial).
235 See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981).
236 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
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7 Potential Plaintiffs and Defendants
Although in most respects Title VII is considerably
broader than § 1981-as it protects against discrimination on
the basis of sex, religion, color, and national origin, as well as
race237-independent contractors are protected by the latter
but not the former.238
Section 1981 allows for more potential defendants than
Title VII. 239 Supervisors who commit discriminatory acts in
violation of § 1981 can be held individually liable. 40 This is in
stark contrast to court interpretations of Title VII, which have
uniformly held that the statute does not permit individual
liability 241
Except with respect to state and local governments,
entity liability under § 1981 is roughly coextensive with Title
VII. Under Title VII, "employer" is defined to include both the
employer and its agents. The employer is automatically liable
for any tangible discriminatory act taken by a supervisor
237 Section 1981 protects individuals of any race from discrimination on
the basis of race or ancestry, but not national origin or alienage status directly. See
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (whites as well as blacks
can assert rights under § 1981, even though the statute secures to all the same
contracting rights as "white citizens"); St. Francis Coll. v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604
(1987).
238 See, e.g., Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999).
239 One exception to this is with respect to federal employees, who may sue
under § 1981 only when they are not covered by Title VII. See Brown v. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976). Title VII, as amended in 1991, applies to most federal
employees. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 (1991).
240 See, e.g., Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir.
1997) (permitting individual liability against employees who have the authority to act
on behalf of an employer with respect to making and enforcing contracts); Jones v.
Cont'l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (permitting individual liability under
§ 1981); Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 753 (7th Cir. 1985); Hicks v. IBM,
44 F Supp. 2d 593, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (permitting supervisors involved m the
discriminatory activity to be held individually liable under § 1981); see also Jett v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (permitting, without discussion,
individual liability under § 1981).
241 See Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (no
individual liability under Title VII); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir.
1996) (same); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (same); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 1995)
(same).
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against an employee.2 42 Tis is so because, under traditional
agency principles, an employer is held responsible for the acts
of its agents undertaken within the scope of employment or
when aided by the agency relation. When a supervisor refuses
to hire, demotes, or fires an employee on the basis of race, he is
acting as the employer's agent and therefore rendering him
liable. The same approach is generally taken under § 1981.
One difference between Title VII and § 1981 may relate
to the liability of state and local governments for racially
discrimiatory employment actions. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 has muddied tis area somewhat. Prior to 1991, the
Supreme Court had severely limited the liability of state and
local governments under § 1981. In Jett v. Dallas Independent
School Distnct,24 the Court held, drawing on its prior
interpretation of § 1983, that a plaintiff must show that a
§ 1981 violation was undertaken pursuant to an official custom
or policy of the governmental entity being sued.244 This
heightened showing made governmental liability more elusive.
But in 1991, Congress added a provision to § 1981, making
242 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) ("courts have
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by
supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or
approved of the supervisor's actions"); Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 760 (holding
employer automatically liable for tangible employment actions). This holding almost
certainly applies to race. See, e.g., EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer
Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors at 4 (Jun. 21, 1999), available at
http://www.eeoc.govldocslharassment.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2001) (noting that
employer liability rules set forth in Burlington Indus. and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), apply to discrimination on all protected bases); Richardson
v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that rules of
liability apply to racial harassment); Allen v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 405 (6th
Cir. 1999) (same). A different rule of liability applies to harassment (racial or
otherwise) that does not result in a tangible employment action. There, the employer's
liability is subject to an affirmative defense based on efforts to prevent and correct
harm and based on the victim's use of available grievance procedures. See Faragher,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
243 491 U.S. 701 (1989).
244 Arguably, this case also meant that states could not be sued directly, since
that is the case under § 1983. This contention comes from the Supreme Court's
suggestion that a § 1981 plaintiff must meet all § 1983 procedural requirements in
order to maintain a suit against a state or local governmental actor. Under § 1983, the
state is not itself an actor that can be sued. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 64 (1989); see also LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 12, at 337-39.
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clear that it prohibited both "nongovernmental discrimination
and impairment under color of state law"2'
Court interpretations of the Civil Rights Act's effect on
Jett have been varied. Some have held that all of Jett's
limitations on liability survived the 1991 Act.246 Others have
held that while states can be sued directly under § 1981,
plaintiffs must still prove the existence of an official policy or
custom of discrimination. 247
B. Some Empirical Evidence about the Use of§ 1981
There is only one systematic study comparing the use of
§ 1981 with Title VII.248 In that study, which was conducted
before Congress authorized damage awards under Title VII
and before Patterson desiccated and Congress restored the
statute's power, § 1981 played a significant role in challenging
employment discrnnmation.249 The study evaluated every
§ 1981 case filed in fiscal year 1980-81 in three federal
districts250 and found that § 1981 was invoked the third most
often, behind Title VII and § 1983,251 in civil rights cases.
Other federal civil rights statutes, like Title VI, which
prohibits race discrimination in federally assisted programs,
and Title IX, which prohibits sex discrimination in education,
were far behind § 1981.252 The study, however, found no
significant differences in outcome or procedural progress
between § 1981 and Title VII. Success rates, litigation burden,
and settlement rate were roughly comparable under both
statutes.253 The study also showed that nearly half of the
plaintiffs filing race-based Title VII claims also made a § 1981
claun.254 The authors had trouble specifically explaining the
245 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c) (1994).
246 See, e.g., Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000).
247 See, e.g., Fed'n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d
1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1996); see also LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 12, at 340-41.
248 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 204, at 596.
24 9 Id. at 603.
25 0 Id. at 598.
251 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statute that permits plaintiffs to seek money
damages for violations of federal constitutional and some statutory rights.
252 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 204, at 599.
25 3 Id. at 600.
254 Id. at 603.
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nine percent of the race discrimination cases that raised a §
1981 claim but not a Title VII claim, although the size of
employer may have been relevant.
The study also showed that, despite published opinons
suggesting a widespread use in general contracting cases,
§ 1981 was used primarily in the employment context.255
Nearly eighty percent of cases filed raised claims of
employment discnminatin.256
But now that Title VII has been strengthened by the
availability of compensatory and pumtive damages, and § 1981
has been restored to its pre-Patterson vitality, does § 1981
continue to be important? My own brief examination of recent
§ 1981 cases suggests that it does.
Based on a review of all district court decisions within
the Second Circuit in 1999 and 2000, in which a § 1981 claim is
raised, I conclude that § 1981 continues to be actively invoked
by plaintiffs complaining of race discrimination. 257 It appears
to be most important in the employment context. More than
eighty-five percent of the cases involved claims of workplace
discrimination, most often discriminatory discharge (31%),
racial harassment (12%), and discriminatory failure to hire or
promote (11%).258 The remaining § 1981 claims were raised in
the context of education or government contracting.25 9 Section
1981 plaintiffs tend to be African-American (52%), Hispamc
(9%), and Asian-American (7%), in that order.260 Sixty percent
255 Published opinions suggest that § 1981 was used to challenge school
segregation, racially exclusive private clubs, and discrimination in general contracting.
See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (schools); Sullivan, 396 U.S. 229
(private clubs); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973)
(private clubs).256 Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 204, at 601.
257 See Grossman Study (data on file with author). The usefulness of a study
based solely on published opinions is often questionable because such a significant
proportion of cases filed never reach that stage. But the purpose of this study is only to
attain a profile of § 1981 plaintiffs and cases, as a basis for drawing some preliminary
conclusions about its continuing importance in an age when civil rights plaintiffs have
other avenues of relief. In this context, the deficiencies normally attributable to this
type of study are not particularly relevant.
258 See id.
259 See td.
260 See id. The race of the plaintiff cannot be determined in twenty-five
percent of these cases.
2001]
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
of these plaintiffs work for private employers, twenty-nine
percent for public ones.261
Section 1981 appears to be used concurrently with
rather than to the exclusion of other federal civil rights
remedies.2 62 Sixty-nine percent of the cases including a § 1981
claim also included a Title VII claim. Section 1981 claims were
also coupled with § 1983 claims (31%), § 1985 claims (18%),
and related state law claims (29%).263 Although very few cases
provide information about the size of the defendant-employer,
the cases in which Title VII claims are also brought (69%)
presumptively involve employers with at least the statutory
minimum number of employees-fifteen.
Where plaintiffs are protected by both Title VII and
§ 1981, the latter may be used to hold the individual
discriminator liable. At least a third of the § 1981 claims
included a claim against the individual supervisor responsible
for the alleged discrimination.
This data also proves the importance of the primary
question addressed in this article: whether § 1981 should apply
to at-will employees. Although very few cases explicitly
characterize the relationship between the plaintiff and the
employer as at-will or otherwise, most claims appear to be
brought by at-will employees.
CONCLUSION
The real story of § 1981 and at-will employment is that
four federal appellate courts have reached the right
conclusion-that at-will employees benefit from the same
protection against racial discrimination as employees working
for a contractual term of employment-for the wrong reasons.
Jackie Lauture does not have a viable case under § 1981 just
because New York law defines her relationship with her
employer as contractual in nature. She has a viable claim
because under basic common law principles, both state and
federal, at-will employment is treated as a contract.
261 See id.
262 See Grossman Study, supra note 257.
263 See td.
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Each of the five appellate courts that addressed the
applicability of § 1981 to at-will employment rested its decision
expressly on the law of the state in which the suit was brought.
The one court to break ranks with the majority did so because
Illinois law dictated that result. What is interesting about
these cases is that not one court considered whether state law
is the appropriate source of law for answering the question
posed.
The question of whether federal or state law should be
used to define the term "contract" in § 1981 is not
uncomplicated. One approach is to look to a long line of cases
that say federal statutes must be interpreted according to
federal standards, to be drawn from federal common law With
this approach, Congress is presumed to have intended a
nationwide, uniform rule, a goal that would be subverted by
allowing the rule to differ state-by-state based solely on the
origin of the lawsuit. State law may be used, however, as the
rule of decision where uniformity is not paramount, or where
other considerations make it appropriate. In any event, it may
be looked to in fashioning a uniform, federal rule. Under this
approach, § 1981 should be interpreted to require a uniform
federal rule that recogmzes at-will employment as contractual.
A second approach is to incorporate § 1988 into the
analysis. Although there is an argument that § 1988 does not
apply because an undefined substantive term is not clearly
"deficient," within the meaning of the statute, even if it does
apply, it may also dictate the use of federal rather than state
law Although with § 1988 there appears to be a presumption
that state law should be used to fill in gaps in federal civil
rights legislation, that presumption can be rebutted where the
use of state law would jeopardize the need for nationwide
uniformity or would be otherwise inconsistent with federal law
or policy The application of § 1981 to at-will employees may
present a case where that presumption can be rebutted.
Under either approach, federal common law appears to
be the appropriate source of law to define "contract" as used in
§ 1981. Section 1981, enacted to stem rampant discrimination
against black Americans by states themselves as well as their
citizens, presents a perfect case for the application of a
uniform, federal law But state law, as well as treatises and
general principles, all inform the substantive analysis of the
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questions whether at-will employment is sufficiently
contractual to come under § 1981. Whether one looks at the
relationship as a unilateral contract, where the employer offers
to pay in exchange for the employee's completed services, or as
a bilateral contract of indefimte duration, under conventional
principles of contract law, the relationship is a valid contract.
That is sufficient to make § 1981, and its protections against
race discrmnnation, applicable.
Resolution of this issue is important, as § 1981
continues to be invoked today It is used primarily to redress
employment discrimination, and, despite some overlap,
provides some advantages over Title VII, including a longer
statute of limitations, uncapped money damages, and a larger
pool of defendants. But perhaps the most important advantage
of § 1981 is that twenty percent of the American workforce does
not benefit from Title VII's protections because they work for
small businesses. For them, many of whom work at-will, § 1981
provides the only federal statutory protection against race
discrimination. The conclusion reached by the four circuits in
the majority is thus important-and correct.
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